28

Complex Cognition (Subject) / Task 9 (Lesson)

This lesson was created by maxmenke.

Learn lesson

back  |  next 1 / 1

• Linguistic relativity the ways in which speakers of any given language think are influenced by the language they speak
• Whorfian hypothesis – language determines/influences thinking Deterministic/Strong position Intermediate position
• Whorfian Hypothesis Deterministic/ Strong Position §  : differences in language inevitably cause differences in thought (= unable to think about a topic if we don’t have the relevant words available to us) g not supported g  Numerical cognition: in absence of linguistic terms for specific numbers people of some cultural groups are not able to understand associated numerical concepts (however still have rough estimation skills, e.g. people that can only count up to 2)
• Whorfian Hypothesis Intermediate Position §  language influences certain aspects of cognition such as perception & memory (= language causes preferences but these can be easily eliminated if not useful) g supported g  Effects of language are very task-specific (e.g. temporal estimation) g  E.g. language without numbers could still perform exact quantitative matches
• Language influences... P  Language causes a tendency for people to attend to, perceive & remember information in certain ways §  Colour categorisation affected by language §  Odour: less olfaction words in Americans = less able to describe odours as compared to other cultures §  Spatial perception: absolute terms of space in Guugu whatever people vs. relative directions (more recent) of Europeans g  Also connected to time §  Perception of Agency: Spanish vs. English for intentional (= both agentive) vs. unintentional acts (= Spanish non-agentive description) g  Agentive description = better memory, non-agentive to avoid blame
• Metaphors: Pragmatic Model -Grice P  Three stages of processing metaphorical & other figurative statements 1.       Assess literal meaning 2.       Decide whether it makes sense in the current context 3.       If it is inadequate, search for suitable non-literal meaning P  Unsupported: predicts that metaphorical meanings are assessed more slowly than literal ones which is not the case
• Metaphors: Predication Model - Kintsch P  Metaphor understanding consists of 2 components 1.       Latent semantic analysis component – represents meanings of words based on their relations with other words g  Non-directional process of finding common meanings 2.       Construction-integration component – use info from first step to construct interpretations of statements g find relevant features (e.g. lawyers are sharks g aggressive is relevant but not fins or swimming so inhibited) g  Directional process from argument (e.g. lawyer) being projected to predicate (e.g. sharks) Support P      Non-reversibility metaphor – e.g. my surgeon is a butcher  my butcher is a surgeon §  Changing the argument changes the features selected P  Took longer to understand the metaphor when literal meanings were primed P  People with good WM are quicker as they more easily inhibit unnecessary features Limitations Only refers to “A is B” metaphors, not correlation metaphors (my research is off to a great start)  g what are the processing differences?
• Common Ground P  Shared knowledge & beliefs possessed by a speaker & a listener that facilitates communication (Example Psychologist) P  Major goal of conversation: increasing & extending common ground
• Egocentric Heuristic - Keysar P  Strategy used by listeners in which they interpret what they hear based on their own knowledge rather than based on common ground P  Use this effortless heuristic rather than the effortful way of figuring out the knowledge existing on common ground Support P  Priming of American culture (more egocentric) leads to more bias than priming of Chinese culture (less egocentric) P  Bookcase experiment: when speaker said “put small candle above it” they tended to look at the one the speaker couldn’t see, not the smaller of the candles the speaker could see g  weren’t referring to common ground Limitations P  When there are already existing memory associations of common ground, the process is much more effortless when having to construct it (e.g. association between speaker & cat picture) P  Much less common ground between strangers g heuristic less often used between friends Very artificial sitch – in real life, objects that are directly in front of two people are not only seen by one of them
• Working Memory P  Individual differences in working memory capacity influence language comprehension P  Hypothesis 1: high WM = high attention & attentional control = reduced mind-wandering = better comprehension (supported) P  Hypothesis 2: form more effective situation models when reading (supported) P  Hypothesis 3 : better at discriminating between relevant & irrelevant info o   Support: low WM = greater seductive details effect (= tendency to reduce comprehension of a text with irrelevant info)   Limitations P  Individual differences also correlate strongly with IQ & vocabulary P  Processing differs a lot across individuals so not sure whether other processes play into it
• Advertisement
• Inferences ð  Discourses are less ambiguous than single sentences & involve drawing inferences Logical Inferences  Bridging Inferences  Elaborative Inferences 
• Logical Inferences ð  – depend only on the meaning of the words (e.g. a widow is a female)
• Bridging Inferences ð  establish coherence between current and preceding part of the text (also backward inferences) §  Anaphor resolution – pronoun/noun has to be linked to previous one (e.g. Tom sold Dave his CD because he hated it) g  Easier when in same order, high WM g  Only automatic when meaning of text processed thoroughly
• Causal Inferences §  work out causal relationships between sentences §  Two stages of forming bridging inferences: (1) bonding: automatic activation of words from preceding sentences (simple) and (2) resolution which involves ensuring that the overall interpretation is consistent with context
• Elaborative Inferences ð  based on own knowledge & involve adding details to a text §  Forward/predictive inference – anticipation of the future
• Constructivist Approach -Bransford P  Readers construct mental models of sitch & events described P  Numerous (automatic) elaborative inferences are drawn during reading even when not required Correct when reader enjoying what is read/ when reading in a leisurely pace
• Minimalist Approach - Mckoon P  Inferences are either automatic (only a few!) or strategic (= goal directed) P  Some automatic inferences establish local coherence (= make sense of a few sentences) §  Involves parts of the text in WM at the same time P  Other automatic inferences rely only on information readily available as it is explicitly stated in the text P  Strategic inferences are formed in pursuit of the readers goals and sometimes produce local coherence P  Most elaborative inferences are made at recall rather than during reading P  Correct when quickly reading the text, when text lacks global coherence, when reader has little background knowledge
• Inferences and reading skills: General ð  People typically form bridging inferences to make coherent sense of what they are reading ð  People rapidly use contextual info & knowledge about the world to form inferences ð  Many inferences are often drawn automatically but depends on many factors (WM, engagement) ð  Goals are important in determining whether predictive inferences are drawn ð  Readers with superior reading skills draw more inferences
• Schema Theory - Bartlett P  Schemas contain much of the information we need to understand what we heart & read and allow us to form expectations P  Comprehension of & memory for discourse depends on top-down processing triggered by schemas P  3 types of error §  Rationalisation – error in story recall that conform to one’s cultural expectations (either schematic distorts comprehension or retrieval processes (Bartlett favoured the latter)) §  Levelling – omitting unfamiliar details from recall §  Sharpening – selecting certain details for embellishment P  Info in discourse shows rapid forgetting whereas schematic knowledge does not thus the tendency for schematic knowledge to produce distortions in discourse memory should increase over time P  Scripts= Knowledge about events and consequences P  Frames= Knowledgedes (Building has 4 walls) P  Schemata that are scored in long term memory Support P  The later the recall the more they wrongly believed that a sentence about Jews was part of the Hitler story they were given to remember g tend to remember things that weren’t there just because they’re schema consistent P  When asked to retrieve story from different points of views (2 characters in the story) recall was enhanced g supports schema-driven retrieval Limitations P  Disagreements about definitions of schemas & what exact info they contain P  Only re-description of data – no evidence of actual activation of schemas (no independent evidence for their existence) so hard to test P  Not sure when exactly & how a given schema is activated P  Exaggerate how error prone we are Schemas often actually affect comprehension processes
• Construction-Integration Model -Kintsch 1.       Turn sentences in text into propositions representing its meaning 2.       Constructed propositions are stored briefly together with associatively related propositions (inferences) §  Many unimportant propositions stored at this point g inefficient & context ignored g bottom-up! 3.       Integration process: Spreading activation process selects propositions for the text representation (context involved to weed out irrelevant propositions g top-down!) §  Clusters of highly interconnected proposition attract most activation g greatest probability of inclusion in text representation §  Within the text representation it’s hard to distinguish between propositions based on text and those based on inferences 4.       3 levels of representations are constructed §  Surface representation (= text itself) §  Propositional representation/ text base (= propositions formed from text) §  Sitch representation (= mental model describing the sitch referred to in text) that as only one mostly depends on integration process Support P  Most complete representation of the text (sitch) was best remembered over course of time while least complete representation (surface) was remembered worst   Limitations P  Unlikely that construction process only involves bottom-up processing (finding that goals can influence readers attention very early) P  Disregards emotions, goals & imagery P  Ignores two levels of discourse representation: text genre level, communication level P  Doesn’t say which inferences play a role P  Not specific about how sitch models are constructed At this point I’ve had 3 mental breakdowns and now a headache that’s probs going to last for days – I hate this book.
• Event-Index Model P  About narrative rather than expository texts P  Also emphasises that readers construct situation models P  Monitor five aspects of a story to see whether their sitch-model needs updating §  Protagonist in present event compared to previous one §  Temporality: relationship between the times at which the present and the previous event occurred §  Causality: causal relationship of current event to previous one §  Spatiality: relationship between spatial settings §  Intentionality: relationship between characters goals and present event P  Discontinuity in any of those aspects leads to more processing effort P  Are monitored independently thus processing effort greater when more than one is outdated (supported) P  What happens when outdated info is updated? §  Here-and-now view (EIM): most current info is more available than outdated one §  Resonance view: new info in a text resonates with all text-related info stored in memory thus outdated info can influence comprehension process Limitations only applicable to simple, narrative stories, ignores determinants of comprehension
• Event-Segmentation Theory - Zacks P  Updating of a sitch model can take 2 main forms §  Incremental updating of individual dimensions (as said in EIM) g “brick by brick” §  Global updating in which the whole model is replaced g “from scratch” §  Both are supported P  Continuous actions are segmented into events (supported: within event memory better than across event memory)
• Talking and Thinking European P  Background: language had a privileged position (Greeks thought there was no greater skill to be a good debater) g belief that thought & speech are closely related P  Analytic thinking with focus on separate parts lends itself well to spoken words (e.g. describe face before P  Support: inferred with ability to process face as a whole so worse recall P  Thoughts are verbal P  Support: thinking aloud has little impact on performance while reciting the alphabet impairs Infer things about people based on what they say (e.g. preferences of pens)
• Implicit vs. explicit communication European P  Low-context culture = more explicit §  Little involvement among peeps thus less shared information & stronger need for people to communicate explicitly Support: Chronically attend to meaning of words than to tone with which is spoken
• Talking and thinking -Asian P  Background: less emphasis on talking (Lao Tzu: He who knows doesn’t speak. He who speaks doesn’t know) g never cultivated the belief that thought & speech are closely related P  Holistic thinking makes it difficult to express words as you can’t describe multiple relations at once     P  Thoughts are non-verbal P  Support: thinking aloud impairs the performance on IQ items while saying the alphabet has little impact See less of a connection between what one says and who one is
• Implicit vs. Explicit communication- Asians P  High-context culture = more implicit §  Deeply involved with each other which leads them to have much shared information that guides their behaviour Support: Habitually attend to tone with which things are said rather than precise content ð  Less speech doesn’t necessarily mean less communication: in fact, the closer we are to someone the more we rely on non-verbal communication
• Foreign-Language Effect P  Tendency to avoid biases (= characteristic of type 1 processing) when thinking in a non-native language §  E.g. reduced tendency toward loss aversion, framing effect P  Shapes moral judgement P  Trolley dilemma §  Lever case: controlled system overrides emotional system g  No differences between non-native vs. native language g equally likely to give utilitarian response §  Bridge case (emotional condition): proposed action emotionally salient thus emotional system predominated g  Effect based on language condition g non-native more likely to act utilitarian §  Some decrease in u-response for non-native language (for those with lowest proficiency) as cognitively too demanding P  Heightened utilitarianism – encourages deliberate thinking of system 2 (increased feelings of processing difficulty promotes greater analytic thinking) = think more (nope…) P  Blunted deontology account – stunts emotional/ heuristic processing characteristic of system 1 g more systematic = feel less §  Support: reduced skin conductance, taboo words rated less emotional §  Support: foreign language promotes less confidence in moral evaluations g intuitive processes remain active (if they weren’t one should be confident about their calculated decision) §  Support: no improved performance on tasks where correct responding requires the inhibition of an intuitive incorrect answer P  Possible explanation: language in which something is encoded facilitates recall g moral violations depend on norms which have been learned through social interactions in one’s native language g native language is more likely to activate social/ moral norms than foreign language §  Only footbridge dilemma involves prohibited action, hence the differences
• Bilingualism g  Smaller vocabulary but better cognitive control g  Language switching activates DLPFC which is responsible for managing attention to language g  Need to manage two jointly activated languages leads to enhancement of control mechanisms with the consequence that other types of cognitive control are also enhanced g  Mentally more flexible (= able to adapt to ongoing changes and process info efficiently & adaptively) §  Better inhibition (inference suppression (bivalent stimulus) not response inhibition (several stimuli)) & conflict monitoring §  Better selection of goal-relevant information §  Better sustained attention g  The more effortful any of these components become, the more likely the bilingual advantage is to emerge

back  |  next 1 / 1