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Complex Cognition (Fach) / Task 7 (Lektion)

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• Game Theory P  Mathematical model to analyse the outcomes that will emerge in multiparty decision-making contexts if all parties act rationally §  Outline conditions that define how decisions are to be made (e.g. order in which players get to choose their moves) §  Attach utility measures of outcomes for each player to every possible combination of player moves P  Want to predict whether or not players will reach an agreement and if so what the specific outcome will be P  Advantage: given absolute rationality, gives the most precise prescriptive advice available to negotiators P  Limitations: rationality isn’t given + hard to provide all possible options
• Decision Analytic Approach P  Want to give the best advice to focal negotiators involved in real conflict with real people (consider that people aren’t always rational) P  Prescriptive from the focal negotiators point of view, descriptive from the competing party’s point of view P  Analytical structure based on the assessment of three key sets of info (building blocks for thinking analytically about a negotiation) §  Each party’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) g  Determines negotiators reservation point – accept what’s above (rather than impasse), decline what’s below g  When we fail to consider BATNA, emotions hold sway and we make wrong decisions §  Each party’s set of interests g  Positions = what parties demand from the other side g  Interest = motive behind those positions g  Focus on deeper interests can suggest creative solutions that help each side get more of what they want §  The relative importance of each party’s interests                  P  Should assess three components before entering any negotiation
• Primary Tasks of Negotiation Simultaneously occuring processes  Claiminig Value Creating Value
• Claiming Value P  Slicing the pie P  Bargaining zone – each party has some reservation point (BATNA) below or above which one prefers impasse P  Positive bargaining zone – reservation points overlap, thus give a set of resolutions both parties would prefer over impasse P  Aim: determine the other party’s reservation point & aim for a resolution that is barely acceptable to the other party Negative bargaining zone – both reservation points don’t overlap so no agreement possible
• Creating Value P  Increases size of pie P  Create value by identifying and adding issues (assessing each parties interests) g then find trade-offs across those P  Possible whenever one party weighs issues differently than the other P  Creates solutions with which both parties are better off than when they had just found a compromise between the initial issues §  Be smart: trade issues of differential value P  Differences are opportunities, not stumbling blocks Contingent Contracts
• Creating Value P  Increases size of pie P  Create value by identifying and adding issues (assessing each parties interests) g then find trade-offs across those P  Possible whenever one party weighs issues differently than the other P  Creates solutions with which both parties are better off than when they had just found a compromise between the initial issues §  Be smart: trade issues of differential value P  Differences are opportunities, not stumbling blocks Contingent Contracts
• Contingent Contracts P  Create value through the development of bets (= actual outcome unknown) P  If-then agreement that states which actions under certain conditions will result in specific outcomes P  Usually occur when parties fail to reach an agreement P  Allow parties to bet on their own (biased) beliefs, thus allow agreement despite biases P  Rejection reveals bluffs & false claims Incentive to perform at/ above contractually specified levels (e.g. sales commissions)
• Tools of Value Creation 1.       Build trust & share information (people more willing to share info when they trust each other) 2.       Ask questions and listen actively 3.       Strategically disclose information §  Info of rather minor importance that focuses on the trades you are willing to make §  Goal: share information incrementally back & forth (reciprocity) §  Minimise own risk: if other party still unwilling just hold back as well 4.       Negotiate multiple issues simultaneously §  More likely to find favourable, value creating trades (bc. what if the other party becomes inflexible after the first agreement?) §  Nothing should be settled until everything is settled §  Come up with package offers 5.       Make multiple offers simultaneously (each equally valuable to me) §  If you only put one offer on the table it results in anchoring and you don’t know any more than before §  Multiple offers show preferences and hence give insight into interests 6.       Search for post-settlement settlements (PSS) §  Pareto-superior agreement – one that is potentially even better for both parties than the agreement they already reached §  Third party puts offers on the table and the other parties can either veto or agree (third party not required though) §  Last step in creating value, with very limited risk
• Different kinds of Power in Negotiations ð  Power in negotiation terms: the probability that a negotiator will influence a negotiation outcome in the direction of his/her ideal outcome §  Higher power = higher likelihood of achieving goals §  Relative concept: depends on all participants of the negotiation 1. Alternatives (BATNA) 2. Information 3. Status 4. Social Capital 
• Kinds of Power: BATNA P  Having multiple alternatives, particularly if at least one of them is highly attractive P  Strong BATNA g less dependent on opposing party g ability to put pressure on opponent P  Better outcome in markets with higher demands P  Can have disadvantages §  Can serve as anchor and lead to satisficing on inferior outcomes §  Can negatively affect people’s motivation & persistence in striving for their ideal targets Strongest of the 4 since it can be leveraged more directly
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• Kinds of Power: Information P  Strategic advantage as one can leverage that info P  Having market info, knowledge of culture, insight into counterparty’s anxieties, reservation price, general expertise in negotiations Find through homework/ due diligence, questions, perspective-taking & educated guessing
• Kinds of Power: Status P  Extent to which the negotiator is respected by the other side P  Low-status people tend to defer to their higher-status counterparts §  Equivalent demands more likely to be granted to high-status negotiator than a low-status negotiator More trust in those with higher status
• Kinds of Power: Social Capital P  Bigger network g improved alternatives, capacity to acquire more valuable info, increased probability of being seen as having high status Serves as facilitator of other types of power
• Types of Power: General ð  Tend to reinforce each other ð  Value of each fluctuates between contexts (e.g. in china social capital is more valuable than BATNA) ð  Bring psychological changes: make negotiators more ambitious and protect them from contextual influences §  Behave more proactively, more likely to make first offer (high influence on outcome)
• Negotiator Cognition (Mistakes): Fixed- Pie Assumption P  Incompatibility bias – assume that their interest conflicts directly with those of the other side P  Leads to interpret sitch as win-lose: anything good for them must be bad for me P  When value claiming too salient P  Inhibits search for mutually beneficial outcomes Support: tend to view same settlement as advantageous when proposed by own party but not when proposed by the other party
• Negotiator Cognition (Mistakes) Framing Effects P  Negotiators with negative frames are less likely to make concessions & reach mutually beneficial outcomes P  Framing depends on perceptual anchor Aim: create anchors that lead the opposition toward a positive frame
• Negotiator Cognition (Mistakes) Escalation of Conflict P  The other side will hold out when it has “too much invested” in its position to now quit P  Announcements of one’s rigid positions increases one’s tendency to escalate non-rationally
• Negotiator Cognition (Mistakes) Overestimation of own Value P  Overestimation of chance that the other side will give you what you want (wrongly set BATNA) P  No positive bargaining zone P  Most likely when knowledge is limited Solution: seek objective value assumption from a neutral party
• Negotiator Cognition (Mistakes): Self-Serving Bias P  Tendency for people to define what is fair in ways that favour themselves P  Different notions of fairness on both sides lead to impasses P  Support: experiment where magnitude of the bias predicted the length of a strike Asymmetry as key driver of self-serving biases
• Negotiator Cognition (Mistakes) Anchoring P  First offers have a strong anchoring effect (not if too extreme then just scary so bye bye settlement)
• Zero-sum perceptions – if one person benefits, the other must make a sacrifice (either-or strategy of conflict resolution)
• Interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut) transformation of motivation g  – one departs from self-interested goals to make choices that are prosocial or promote the well-being of relationship partners §  Alternative to zero-sum thinking: win-win perception – individuals focus on the long-term benefits of sacrificing their self-interest
• Relational Self- Construal g  Perceptions of conflicting interests are partially influenced by self-definition
• Norm of the self-contained individual g  independent individuals less likely to sacrifice own interests §  Perceive choices that benefit the self as necessarily harming the relationship (study 1) §  Perceive choices that benefit the relationship as necessarily harming oneself (study 2)
• Relational self-construal g  – individual defines him/herself in terms of relationships with close others §  Higher likeliness of transformation of motivation and willingness to sacrifice in close relationships §  Don’t perceive conflict as necessarily having zero-sum outcomes but rather as win-win sitch §  Even regret deciding in self-interest 
• Trust Propensity g  Degree to which a person has benevolent expectations of others, even those with whom the person has had no prior interaction §  High -> more cooperative negotiation (which however is risky since it makes you vulnerable) -> affirm to themselves & signal to counterpart both, their motivation to trust & their intention to build trust via their negotiation behaviour ->contributes positively to trust development §  Low ->  vice versa
• Comparative intracultural research P  compares negotiation behaviour & outcomes of individuals from 2 or more nations/ cultural groups P  Cultures draw from common inputs to negotiation but cultural differences emerge in the influence of these inputs on negotiation (= respond differently to inputs)
• Culture by context perspective §  cultures deal differently with contextual factors §  Different biases, goals & levels of trust result in different responding to same contextual influences
• Intercultural negotiators... P  attain worse economic outcomes than intracultural negotiators (create less joint value) §  Have to overcome the underlying differences in their culturally-normative strategies §  Negotiators use the strategy that is normative to their culture but some adapt to their counterpart’s strategy
• Cultural Intelligence P  understanding & appreciation of cultural differences §  High = more relationship management = more cooperative = higher joint gains P  Cultural distance & hierarchal concerns hinder value creation
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• Negotiation differences East Higher emphasis on relational outcomesPersuasion & offer making strategy g more value claiming Low trust (more for ingroup) Less direct mode of confrontation g “downgraders” Show less obvious dominance
• Negotiation Differences West Higher emphasis on economic outcomesInformation exchange g more value creation High trust More direct mode of confrontation g “upgraders” Show more obvious dominance
• Intra-Cultural vs. Inter-Cultural Negotiation – China vs. USA P  Chinese regard ethically questionable negotiation tactics as more acceptable than Americans §  Americans focus on procedure, Chinese focus on outcome §  Stronger ingroup bias in china P  Likelihood of individuals to use ethically questionable tactics will change depending on whether their counterparts come from their own country or when they come from another country P  People adopt different models of what is ethically acceptable for themselves (move closer to counterpart’s tactics) P  SO: no straightforward intergroup bias (would mean that both countries would go up in their ethically questionable tactics) P  Possible explanations: §  Reliance of the reputation & image of the other country §  Perception of china as threat (Chinese don’t feel the same about the states) could lead US to focus more on out-group derogation while Chinese are motivated to reduce questionable tactics to improve reputation in in-group (= in-group favouritism) §  Chinese more insecure in inter-cultural negotiations so use more moral tactics to seek certainties by doing the “right” thing
• Improving Miscommunication ð  Figure out how to express disagreement ð  Recognise what emotional expressiveness signifies ð  Learn how the other culture builds trust (cognitive vs. affective) ð  Avoid yes-or-no questions (mean different things across cultures) ð  Beware of putting it in writing (might be seen as a sign of low trust)
• Gender Differences P  Females: tend to dislike negotiation §  Less likely to initiate or perceive a sitch as negotiable, greater anxiety §  Less likely to negotiate initial compensation g small differences in starting salaries g substantial gaps over time P  Role congruity theory  P  Social role theory  §  Deviation = social backlash §  Women evaluated more negatively when negotiating assertively P  Men achieve on average better economic outcomes but gender differences still vary (depending on sitch & person involved) P  Gender differences were reduced… §  When negotiators had negotiation experience §  When negotiators were provided with the bargaining range §  When negotiators were advocating for another individual §  AND REVERSED under conditions of lowest role incongruity for women Across Cultures…P  Study: compare patriarchal gender roles (western world) with matrilineal gender roles (women inherit economic power) §  Matrilineal females earn more surplus (have experience in seller role) P  Bargaining outcomes across gender can be crucially culture dependent & women don’t have an inherent, natural disadvantage in bargaining §  Offers are rejected less often (hence can afford to be tough)  

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